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ABSTRACT
This study was conducted to determine the nature of
the causes of excessive accumulations of external public
debt in Ghana between 1960 and 1974.
The original hypothesis was that an inflow of
foreign capital reduced the domestic savings capacity,
thereby,reducing the ability to repay, and increasing the
need to borrow and accumulate additional debt. The
regression equation used decribed savings as a function of
capital inflows and gross national product. The result was
that capital inflows had a significantly positive impact on
on domestic savings,and,therefore, did not increase the
tendency toward excessive debt.
The final hypothesis was that the use of foreign
resources to finance the trade and the savings gaps, and the
poor performance of productivity combined to contribute
significantly to the accumulation of debt. The regression
equation used described debt as a function of the financing
of the trade and savings gaps, and the poor performance of
productivity. The results showed that the financing of the
trade gap without a consequent increase in productivity was
largely reponsible for the excessive accumulation of debt.
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INTRODUCTION
It was under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah that Ghana,
located on coastal West Africa, shed its colonial status.
On March 6, 1957, independence was won and Britain's Gold
Coast became independent Ghana. Attempts to develop the
new nation began in 1957, but over the succeeding years few
accomplishments would be made with regard to development.
The excessive levels of externally owed debt in most
developing countries represents an increasingly troublesome
element of development and the mechanisms through which it
is financed. The causes and effects of excessive debt are
pervasive. Cheryl Payer captures the essence of the causes
and effects in the following quote:
"...nations...cannot spend more than they earn
without falling into debt, and a heavy debt burden
bars the way to autonomous action. This is partic-
ularly true when one's creditors are(so one's
customers, suppliers and employers."
The purpose of this essay is to determine, as best as
possible, some of the reasons for excessive debt growth in
Ghana between 1960 and 1974. 1960 to 1974 is important
because it was this period which saw the inception of the
problem as it exists today. The hypothesis I have developed
with regard to the causes is as follows; throughout the
period under study, there was little or no relative growth
in national savings, export earnings or productive capacity.
(1) Payer, Cheryl, The Debt Trap, Monthly Review Press, 1974.
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The consequent saving and trade gaps significantly increased
the need to borrow external finances. It was hoped, that
to the degree the external finances - received to help
close the gaps - could be channelled toward development
investment, that the productive capacity of the economy
could be expanded. Borrowing from abroad meant undertaking
debt liabilities, and to the degree that the productive
capacity did not increase sufficiently to allow repayment
and movement in the direction of autonomous development
financing, it can be said the financing of the gaps through
the use of external finances, without a consequent develop-
ment of productive capacity contributed, significantly, to
the accumulation of debt. The lack of significant expan-
sion of productive capacity was due in large part to the
nature of the projects invested in. Development investment
was channelled primarily into slow and low economic return
social and public service projects such as infrastructure,
and many unsuccessful directly productive agricultural and
industrial projects. Though helpful for long run growth
and development, these types of investments were inappro-
priate considering the required expansion of productive
capacity in the short run. The planned level of produc-
tivity could not be realized given economic returns
experienced by the types of development investments made.
Part One includes; (1) framework which describes
the theoretical role played by foreign aid, the theoretical
problems that may develop and give rise to excessive
growth in debt controlled largely by entities outside of
the economy; and (2) a description of the setting in
which the debt problem initially evolved.
Part Two includes (1) statement of the major hypothesis
and (2) mathematical calculations supporting the hypothesis.
Part Three includes some important policy and planning
issues I have discovered, and the conclusions.
Part I
Theoretical Framework
A developing country may have one of several constraints
on its capacity to develop and grow. One such constraint
is a savings gap defined as "...the inability...to raise the
rate of savings quickly...". Another constraint is a trade
gap defined as "...the inability to import all the goods and
services needed because of shortages of foreign exchange."
Both gaps can be thought of as 'capital requirements'
estimates; the savings gap representing the difference
between investment and savings and the amount by which
savings must be supplemented in order to carry out invest-
ment plans; the trade gap representing the difference between
exports and imports and the amount of foreign exchange needed
to supplement export earnings in order to attain a required
level of imports. E. K. Hawkins states that the significance
of one of these gaps being larger than the other is that the
larger gap represents the' "dominant gap" constraint on
development.
The gap theory also indicates that in the initial
stages of development, it is generally the trade gap that
operates as the major constraint because of the limited
structure of production relative to development needs. The
gap generally consists of a surplus of domestically produced
goods which cannot be applied directly to investment and
(1) Hawkins, E. K., The Principles of Development Aid,
Penguin Books, 1970.
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a deficit of those investment goods, or intermediate goods
which are not produced locally. The economy is, then,
required to import from abroad the goods and services re-
quired for development. The trade gap, operating as a
major development constraint, is financed by external aid
when the domestic economy cannot generate the required
levels of foreign exchange from its export sector. This
was precisely Ghana's situation during the late 1950's as
it embarked upon its development plans. By early 1960's,
however, the savings gap became the dominant gap constraint
in Ghana's attempt to develop. (Refer to Table 6)
The third constraint, absorptive capacity is defined
as "...the inability of the economy to expand both the
quantity and the quality of capacity of output in response
(l)
to the application of additional inputs." The role of
foreign aid (defined as publically guaranteed loans and
credits and does not include direct investment) is to bridge
the gaps, thus helping to increase the absorptive and
productive capacity of the economy. By affecting permanent
changes in the structure of the economy such that standards
of living improve and dependence on external sources of
finance diminish, the developing economy closes its gaps,
expands productive output, increases national income, increas-
es national savings, repays the loans, evolves to a level of
(1) Hawkins, E.K., The Principles of Development Aid,
Penguin Books, 1970.
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development largely financed with domestic resources and
becomes a lender in its own right.
To the extent that the country receives aid in the
form of loans and credits rather than grants, the burden
of servicing the debt may become increasingly problematic
in the balance of payments. It is, therefore, important
to employ the borrowed resources in a manner which will
yield a return at least as high as their interest and amor-
tization costs, and to raise them in a payment form accept-
able to the lender, i.e., foreign exchange. A major obstacle
to the successful transition from net borrower to net
lender is failure to employ the borrowed resources in the
most productive manner. Consequently, the gaps, and the
debts they represent, remain over time.
Setting
The general policy structure of development plans
evolved from heavy levels of public sector investment in
social, physical and economic infrastructure during pre-
independence days to heavier investment in state owned
industrial and agricultural enterprises during the early
post independence days. In other words, the evolution
was from heavy investment in low economic return projects
to projects expected to reap higher economic return.
Guggisberg Ten Year Development Plan (1920-1930)
Development policy around which this plan was
structured around the expansion of the social,
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physical and economic infrastructural bases considered to be
important for development of the export sector and free
trade. Public sector funds were channelled into the devel-
opment of railways, roads, water supplies, harbours, dams,
drainage, communications, maps, surveys, research and agri-
culture. Social services such as health and education also
received significant levels of public sector investments.
The world depression and the outbreak of war cut the
plan short (1927), but by then,half of the originally
scheduled funds had been invested and substantial contrib-
utions had been made to the infrastructural base of the
colony.
In 1929, the Colonial Development Act was set up as a
conscious policy of economic development for all Great
Britain colonies, including Ghana. Though alleged that the
policy was meant to secure the welfare of the colonies, it
is more likely that the Act was a mechanism set in place to
help solve economic problems in Britain by making the
colonies serve as trading outposts of Great Britain.
Development planning meant that "...opportunities were...
created only for the production of raw materials and food-
stuffs which were important to the developed countries while
the colony was regarded as a market for the colonizing
(1)
country's own exports."
(1) Thomas, J., Hansard, 7/29/29
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Under the policy guidance of the 1929 Act, little
changed with regard to Britain's development policy for
Ghana. Between 1930 and 1945, the development budget was
maintained at cut level, but the funds invested were still
highly concentrated on infrastructure required to enhance
the export sector and encourage free trade. Throughout the
period, no long term development program was planned or
implemented.
In 1945, a Colonial Development and Welfare Act was
passed to replace the 1929 Act.
Ten Year Development Plan (1946-1956)
This plan was developed under the policy guidance of
the 1945 Act. The policy structure had not changed;
development of the social, physical and economic infra-
structure. The plan lasted only one year and was essential-
ly ineffectual.
Throughout the 1940's, there was a general discontent
among the Ghanian masses that created the circumstances
that led to the gradual transferal of political power from
expatriates to Ghanians in the 50's.
When Nkrumah became Prime Minister in 1951, his most
important and popular policy was the reduction of 'economic
dependence' through accelerated industrialization and an
expanded role of the state. Development policies formed
during his administration were inspired by a vision of
economic modernization via a 'big push' involving "...a
major investment effort, a strategy centered around an
9.
industrialization drive, emphasizing import substitution,
structural change and a less open economy, to be achieved
(l)
largely by the instrumentalities of the state."
Despite these espoused views on the policy structure
development, it wasn't until the Seven Year Plan was
implemented, in 1964, that the policy was actually put into
action. Between 1950 and 1964, development policy was
still centered around the improvement of the infrastructural
base. This was primarily because Nkrumah was advised to
postpone investment into directly productive industrial and
agricultural ventures, and to encourage foreign private
funds to those sectors by continuing to invest public funds
in infrastructure projects thus creating incentives for
foreign investors. In the Ten and Five Year Development
Plans implemented prior to 1964, substantial public sector
funds were, therefore, channelled to infrastructure projects.
Nkrumah was unsatisfied with the response of foreign private
investors to the incentives provided and decided that Ghana
should undertake development of the directly productive
sectors herself, hence, the attempts to develop state owned
industrial and agricultural enterprises in the Seven Year
Plan.
(1) Killick, Tony, Development Economics in Action, St.
Martin Press, 1978.
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In describing the circumstances under which the debt
accumulated, it is important to understand the nature of
the development plans implemented just prior to the inception
of the debt problem because it was in the pursuit of the
goals and objectives of the plans that Ghana evolved to its
indebted position. Between 1951 and 1962, implementation
began on four development plans in Ghana, none of which were
completed.
Upon examination of the development plans, two import-
ant characteristics are apparent. One is that Ghana's
dependence on foreign aid to finance its development plans
increased over time, particularly with the implementation
of the Seven Year Plan. The second characteristic is the
consistently high percentage of public sector finances
(supplemented increasingly with foreign resources) channeled
to infrastructure projects which tended to reap low economic
returns. It was not until the Seven Year Plan was implement-
ed that the emphasis of public sector finances on infra-
structure and other public and social services shifted
significantly to investment in agriculture and industry, the
faster and more highly productive sector in terms of economic
returns. The combination of heavy investment in projects
which experienced low levels of economic return, and the
increasing use of external finances requiring quick repay-
ment is largely responsible for the accumulation of excessive
debt in Ghana during the period under study.
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Ten Year Plan (1951-1952)
This plan was a response by the colonial government to
popular demands ranging from more and better public and
social service provision to major economic reforms and
political autonomy. The basic premise of the plan was that
infrastructural development was highly correlated to agri-
cultural and industrial development. It was planned that
substantial public sector investment in public and social
services would act as an incentive to attract domestic and
foreign private investment to develop the agricultural and
industrial sectors.
Forty percent of total public investment in the plan
went to communications and infrastructure; 33% went to
social services; 15% went to common services and general
government administration, and, 12% went to agriculture and
industry.
Sixty-two percent of the plan was to be financed from
Ghana's own resources; (35%) from export duties, (17%) from
the recurrent budget, and (10%) from the Cocoa Marketing
Board. The remaining 38% was to be financed by external
borrowing (33%) and British aid funds (5%). Despite the
heavy reliance on external funds to finance the plan, the
government did have substantial reserves from which to
draw should external finances not be forthcoming, and hence
represented the significant potential Ghana had to be
independent and autonomous in financing its development.
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Revised Ten Year Plan (1952-1958)
Upon taking office as Prime Minister, Nkrumah revised
the Ten Year Plan. The revised plan was not significantly
different from the first plan. Development policy was still
based on massive public investment in infrastructure, social,
and public services, and agricultural and industrial support
services, in general, the framework expected to attract
private investment to the industrial and agricultural sectors.
Forty percent of public sector funds were invested in
infrastructure and telecommunications, 25% to general govern-
ment, administration, 21% to social services and 8% to agri-
culture and industry.
Eighty-three percent of the plan budget was to be
financed by Ghana's own resources; (61%) from export duties,
(16%) from the recurrent budget, and (6%) from Cocoa Market-
ing Board reserves. The remaining 17% was to be financed
by borrowing from abroad (15%) and locally (2%). The
revised plan reduced the dependence on external funds by 50%.
Five Year Plan (1959-1964)
In an effort to speed up the development process
enormous amounts of public sector finances were invested
in the same types of projects most heavily invested in in the
first two plans, social and public services and agricultural
and industrial advisory and support service. It was assumed
that the faster this could be done, the faster it could be
expected that private funds would be attracted to developing
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the more productive sectors, i.e., agriculture and industry.
Thirty-one percent of total public investment went to public
services, 30% to social service, 19% to general government
administration, 12% to industry and 8% to agriculture.
Eighty percent of this plan was to be financed by
domestic resources from the recurrent budget and the accumu-
lated reserves. The remaining 20% was to be financed by
external borrowing. The Five Year Plan committed Ghana to
a heavy reliance on high levels of public spending which,
given the types of projects most heavily invested in, even-
tually could. be sustained only by an increasing reliance on
external capital, and by 1964 Ghana experienced a balance
of payments crisis.
Each year between 1959 and 1961 budget deficits in
current account were recorded. The high import content of
investments and the high propensity to import out of margin-
al additions to income resulted in an increase of the
import bill at a rate faster than the increase of export
earnings. The balance of payments on current account turned
from a surplus level in 1959 to a significant deficit by
1961. Government reserves fell and foreign reserves fell at
greater rates. The experience resulted in a development
policy shift from heavy investment emphasis on infrastructure
to heavy investment emphasis on directly productive agri-
culture and industry under policies of import substitution
and export promotion in a new development plan.
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Seven Year Plan (1964-1970)
The implementation of the Seven Year Plan brought about
two major shifts; the large scale development of state owned
agricultural and industrial enterprises; and a heavier
dependence on foreign capital. Domestic public spending on
infrastructural services continued to grow. Investment in
the state-owned industrial and agricultural enterprises was
achieved primarily through the securing of medium term
supplier's and contractor's credits.
Thirty-nine percent of total public investment was
planned for the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, 28%
for social services, 27% for public services and 5% for
general government administration. Fifty percent of the
capital allocated to agriculture and 75% of capital allocat-
ed to industry were invested in state enterprises.
y percent of the investment finances were expected
to come from external borrowing, 24% from Central Bank and/
or deficit financing, 21% from the recurrent budget and -5%
from domestic loans.
Between 1959 and 1965, some important changes took
place in the debt position of the central government.
(Refer to Tables 1-3.) The level of total public debt in
1965 was almost twenty times the 1959 level. The percentage
of external debt in total debt rose from 26% in 1959 to
52% in 1965. The percentage of supplier's credit in total
external debt rose from 14% in 1959 to a peak of 86% in 1963
and declined to 79% in 1965. The increase in credits were
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due largely to the financing needs of the Seven Year Plan.
Supplier's and contractor's credit was undoubtedly
the largest single and most notorious element of the
external debt obligations. Credits encouraged expansion
of the development investment portfolio well beyond what
could have been possible if only domestic resources had
been used, but well beyond the capacity of the economy to
plan and execute the projects thoroughly and efficiently.
Of the credits received (70-75% of total contracted)
about 30% went to agricultural and industrial enterprises
and about 70% went to other sectors, particularly infra-
structure, other construction projects and purchase of
transport equipment. All the credits were made to the
government or to public corporations and therefore had an
implicit Ghana government guarantee.
The fact that debt accumulated significantly with
the acceptance of supplier's credit, was the result of the
lack of productive output arising from the credit financed
projects of the Seven Year Plan. There were many problems
that helped to stifle the expected growth in productive
output.
(1) Inappropriateness of terms - Ghana's debt to
creditors accumulated in large part due to the acceptance
of credits on terms unsuitable for the projects they financed.
Most of the projects invested in could not have generated
the income or savings in foreign exchange within or soon
after the designated repayment period. This was particularly
16,
true to the degree that credit was used to finance infra-
structure and similar type projects and unsuccessful
enterprises.
(2) Inadequate planning - Additionally, the problem
was complicated by inept planning and execution of the
projects with consequent delays. Few of the delays were
taken into account in the scheduling of the repayments.
Making payments on schedule was virtually impossible.
Credits also encouraged bad planning and management
by encouraging overspending and reduced economic/financial
discipline - almost half of the credit financed projects
were not planned to be implemented until the credit was
offered. These unplanned projects did not replace originally
planned projects, but were additions to the planned stock.
This forced the government to resort to short term expedients
such as deficient financing and short term borrowing to
finance planned projects, which aggravated the debt problem.
(3) Corruption - Corruption was a very widespread
problem with regard to the credits. Overcharging was
common and in the end resulted in Ghana's receipt of only
70-75% of the total face value of the credits contracted
and received.
Most of the projects were not subject to competitive
bidding which would have created a tendency toward lower
costs and increased quality; Ghana generally lacked the
expertise and manpower needed to make detailed checks of
contracts and equipment, machinery, etc. upon receipt; the
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administrative muddle, political pressure on officials and
outright dishonesty of independent "consultants" created
circumstances ripe for overcharging. Second hand, obsolete
and defective equipment was supplied at the contract price
of new and current supplies; work (for example, feasibility
studies and training programs) contracted wasn't completed
or done in a perfunctory manner.
State enterprises aside, there were many credit financed
projects that were unnecessarily expensive and lavish. They
included projects such as a Russian atomic reactor and an
Ilyushin aircraft; a French built Tema hotel and Accra
airport terminal; the British Accra-Tema Highway, VC-10
aircraft and naval frigate; the equipment and construction
services from various sources, for the Trade Fair complex,
the OAU conference building, the Nkrumah Ideological In-
stitute and the Takoradi and Kumasi hotels. Those items
represent about 28% of the credits received none of which
can be said to have contributed to the productive output of
the economy.
In considering the credit financed state enterprises,
the lack of sufficient productive output stemmed from
varied problems. Both domestic and foreign misuse of
resources adversely affected the output of the enterprises.
State enterprises had a heavy reliance on foreign consult-
ants, contractors and suppliers in the identifying, planning,
implementation and managing of the projects. The help
provided, however, was generally of low standard; overall
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performance was marred by shoddy work, incompetence, in-
efficiency and irresponsibility. This type of external
intervention merely complicated an already problem ridden
Ghanian administration, thus adding to the sorry circumstances
experienced by the credit financed state enterprises.
Several examples will help to illuminate the problems that
resulted in low productivity of state enterprises.
Ghana had been led to believe that it could reduce its
import bill by constructing a textile mill. The French
offered Ghana what they called ultra modern machinery. Ghana
received from France 500 looms whose production in France
was discontinued when mechanical defects were discovered in
them. In the end, Ghana was trapped with expensive and
faulty machinery which created constant snags in the produc-
tionprocess and required expatriate management-at a price-
to keep the mill in operation at less than half capacity.
In an attempt to expand export earnings, Ghana elected
to process, for export, part of its cocoa product. A
German company, anxious to sell plant and equipment, helped
to establish two new cocoa processing factories. Plans for
one of the factories was extended before any work was done to
4 times its original capacity and almost four times its
original cost. The new proposal was to include an entire
complex capable of processing 200,000 tons of cocoa annually
into a variety of cocoa products. By the coup in 1966, only
the cocoa silos and chocolate factory had been completed
and Ghana had paid 50% of the total cost of the entire
19.
project, (in down payment and debt service) more than the
cost of the work that had been carried out. Major design
faults rendered the silos useless for their intended purpose
(cocoa storage) and the factory could operate only at a loss
and served only the small domestic market. Throughout the
process, the behavior of the contractors was evasive; they
refused to give any specifications of plant or equipment,
to allow inspection of machinery or to supply the manu-
facturer's name before completion.
A shoe factory constructed by the Czechs had several
problems. The object was to substitute domestic production
for a rapidly rising import bill for shoes. The Czechs,
as the primary exporter of shoes to Ghana, were asked, in
1961 to design a shoe factory. The hide from cattle
processed in the Bolgatanga meat factory would supply the
Czech tannery which would in turn provide the main input
for the shoe factory at Kumasi (Ghana). When the factory
was completed in 1967, it became apparent that the earlier
phases of the production chain had gone wrong, consequently,
the factory was forced to indefinitely rely on imported
leather. The Czechs had estimated a 10% rate of return,
but it turned out that the initial capital outlay was at
least 50% too large to expect such a return. The factory
plans included expensive provisions for workshops, an
office block, recreation facilities, canteens and other
non-essentials, which the Czechs insisted on as a part of
a 'new deal for labor', but which they themselves weren't
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financing. In the end, the additional amenities ruined
the project. The contract for construction of the addition-
al elements was given to a British firmwhich had to with-
draw from work in progress as the required credit could not
be raised in Britain. This, and other delays, allowed six
years to lapse between the original agreement and actual
production. In the interim, the shoemaking technology and
shoe styles had changed enough so that the factory's output
became dated. Additionally, three private shoe factories
came into production at about the same time as the state
factory, but produced cheaper and more fashionable shoes,
leaving the state's factory's first six months output unsold.
Yugoslav credits were received to build canning factories
that the Yugoslavs claimed would experience rates of return
between 15% and 20%. This calculation was based on the
assumption that the raw materials would be available local-
ly and that there would be a ready market in and around
Ghana. No feasibility studies or market research had been
carried out to test these assumptions. Later estimates in-
dicate that the raw materials (fruit) available for canning
were only a fraction -10%-50%- of what was required to
achieve the planned for return rate. Also, the bulk of the
demand for the products at the planned for rate of return
would have come from outside Ghana.
The massive use of credit to finance infrastructure
and other construction projects and unsuccessful state
enterprises was the single largest contributor to Ghana's
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debt problem. Infrastructure is traditionally unproductive
and the failure of the state enterprises to expand product-
ive output made the repayment of the credits virtually
impossible.
Ghana received credits from private Western suppliers
and from Eastern governments. The peak period of credits
from the West (representing 75% of the total credit obli-
gation) was between 1963-1964. The peak period for credits
from the East was between 1962-1963.
The terms of the credits received from the West were
commercial rather than concessional (For political reasons,
Ghana was unable to attract concessional loans from the
West.) The maturities averaged between 5-8 years and the
interest rates 5-6%. Eastern credits tended to be softer
with 12 year maturities and 2-3% interest rates. The re-
payment terms of the credits required substantial investment
in highly and quickly productive projects which, as stated
earlier, did not occur. Had credit financed projects been
able to contribute to output and revenue quickly, the strain
of repayment would have been significantly lessened. How-
ever, the credits were not used in the most productive manner
and were often subject to corruption and graft.
By 1965, most of the credits were beginning to fall
due. By 1966, the debt burden, largely caused by inability
to repay credits had grown so great, that it became clear
that Ghana would not be able to honor its contractual
obligations. In December 1966, under the prescribed
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stabilization plan of the IMF, Ghana rescheduled her debt
payments. Eighty percent of the interest and principal due
was consolidated over a 2-1/2 year period, followed by a
2-1/2 year grace period with a bilaterally arranged
moratorium interest averaging around 6%.
Part of the IMF package, as a condition for the
receipt of standby credit, included the devaluation of the
Ghanian cedi. The devaluation resulted in a 31% increase
in the nominal external debt burden (Table 2).
Despite the rescheduling, external debt continued to
bear heavily on the economy and development efforts, the
major problem being the repayment of medium term credit.
In 1968 another rescheduling took place. The
agreement reached was similar to the 1966 agreement with
the following exceptions: a 3-1/2 year consolidation
period followed by a two and a half year grace period and
a 7-1/2 year repayment period. The combined moratorium
interest due from both reschedulings substantially in-
creased the debt. Estimates of the percentage of the
increase of external debt due to the institution of the
(1)
moratorium interest increase vary from 20-45%.
In 1969, a much harder line was taken in the negotia-
tions with creditors. Easier repayment terms such as the
dissolution of the moratorium and contractual interest
(1) Cheryl Payer estimates that the increase in external
debt due to the moratorium interest was 45% of the
original debt obligation; Douglas Rimmer writing for
Africa South of the Sahara estimates a 20% increase.
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and longer range settlement to facilitate planning were
requested. Proposals that the credits be refinanced with
official loans on softer terms so that any surplus foreign
exchange earnings could be used to finance development
rather than debt repayment were made, but to no avail. Debt
repayment continued to exert pressure on the economy and
development efforts,and by 1970 plans for another reschedul-
ing were being made. The plan included another devaluation
of the cedi and another nominal increase in debt. Upon
implementation, public outrage was so strong that a coup
took place and the new administration immediately rescinded
the devaluation and the plan. Additionally, the new
administration instituted a moratorium on all short and
medium term debts, including arrears, repudiated a significant
percentage of the Nkrumah debts and announced that only
those supplier's credits linked to economically viable
projects not "vitiated by fraud, corruption or other
illegality" would be honored, and those, only on IDA terms
(10 year grace periods and 50 year amortizations).
The hard line adopted by the new administration resulted
in negotiations that were much more amenable to the allevia-
tion of Ghana's debt problem. The demands were taken into
consideration by creditors and Ghana received the most
generous rescheduling package to date. The settlement
allowed for repayment over 28 years with an interest rate
of 2.5% and an initial grace period of two years.
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Part Two
Hypothesis. What caused debt to grow?
Originally, this essay was to be based on the
existence of a negative correlation between capital inflows
and savings. It was assumed that the disclosure of an
inverse relationship between foreign aid and savings would
help to highlight the negative impact of foreign aid on
savings, thus its adverse effect on the ability to repay
loans, and consequently, the excessive growth of debt,
which has stifled autonomous growth and increased the
dependency of the borrowing economy. It was expected that
a cyclical pattern would evolve whereby foreign aid would
reduce savings and, consequently, increase the future need
for more aid.
(1)
The regression equation used was S = a+b (Y) + c(F)
in which S = savings; Y = gnp; and F = foreign aid in the
form of loans and grants. The results were: S = 7.98 +
.117 (Y) + .886 (F). The most important outcome of the
regression was the positive sign of the coefficient for F
immediately nullifying the original hypothesis that foreign
aid negatively impacted savings, thus crippling repayment
capabilities and encouraging the growth of debt. The two
independent variables Y and F account for almost 90% (.891)
(1) The equation was taken from a paper written by Bernard
Wassow "Dependency in a Capital Importing Economy", Ox-
ford Economic Papers.
The data for the equation was taken from the Economic
Survey of Ghana and the World Tables.
25.
of the variance in S. The results indicate that a single
unit change in Y could be expected to bring about a .12 unit
change in S. The t value is equal to 9 indicating a .005
level of significance. Therefore, we can be 99% certain
that the above relationship between Y and S is not
insignificant. The results also indicate that a single unit
change in F can be expected to bring about a .89 unit change
in S. The t value is equal to 1.27 indicating a .15 level
of significance and 85% certainty of the.non insignificance
of the relationship between F and S. Certainly, the
original hypothesis is not supported by the outcomes of
this regression; there appears to be a positive and not
insignificant relationship between foreign aid and savings.
It is important to note, however, that the national account
and other economic data on Ghana is inadequate and in-
consistent. Certainly, other data from other reliable
sources are highly likely to yield different results. In
fact, the first time I did the regression, the sign was as
expected .(negative), but the overall significance was low.
The succeeding hypothesis concerning the causes of debt
escalation is related to the behavior of national savings,
export earnings and productive output. Growth of these
three elements are key to the ability to repay debts, however,
they remained low relative to what was required for repay-
ment obligations. This effectively meant that the use of
foreign savings to supplement inadequate domestic resources
(savings and export earnings) created a debt which when
26.
coupled with the low levels of productive output became
unserviceable.
Refer to Table 4. The column labelled NS/NI
represents the ratio of national savings to national
income. It is apparent from the Table that the ratio
remained low throughout the period under study and experienced
no absolute growth. The column labelled A NS/NI/NS/NI
represents the annual growth rates of the ratio which were
primarily negative up to 1967 and insignificantly positive
after 1967. Theoretically, if the debts were to be repaid
without seriously crippling the economy and development
efforts, the growth of the ratio should have been significantly
positive. The ability to repay debts was highly correlated
to the growth of savings resulting from income growth (which
resulted from investments). In spite of growth in invest-
ments and a fairly consistent growth in national income,
national savings did not experience growth required for
debt repayments. Consequently, debt and dependence on
foreign aid grew.
Refer to Table 5. The column labeled A E/E represents
the annual growth rates of export earnings. The column
labeled A M/M represents the annual growth rates of imports.
When Ghana began to actively seek out and receive foreign
aid, it was primarily because its export earnings were not
sufficient for payment of import bills. It was expected
thatat some point,with the help of foreign aid financed
investments and imported investment inputs, the export
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earnings would expand, thus, rendering the economy self-
sufficient enough to service debt payments with domestic
resources, and reduce the need for future borrowing to
finance the import bill. In order for these expectations
to be fulfilled, the export earnings would have had to
develop to a level at which its growth rate would be greater
than the growth rate of the import bill. This did not
occur. Debt did allow the expansion of the import bill
beyond domestic financing capacity, however, the new export
earnings generated by new development investments did not
grow fast enough to help repay the debts. In the period
under study, the growth rate of imports was faster than that
of exports for seven years; the growth role of imports
was slower than that of exports for four years; and, in
three years, both imports and exports experienced negative
growth. The average annual growth rate for imports and
exports was 12% and 10% respectively.
The slow growth of savings and exports was indicative
of the problem which required the use of external finances
for development purposes. In each year of the study period,
there was a trade and savings gap,* both substantially
negative (i.e. imports were greater than exports and invest-
ments were greater than savings) with the exceptions of
The trade gap is defined as the "resource gap" published
by the World Bank in the World Tables (1976 and 1980);
the savings gap is derived from the national savings and
domestic investment figures published in the same tables.
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1972 and 1973 years in which the terms of trade for Ghana's
exports became favorable. The financing of these gaps in
itself should not have created problems for the economy,
theoretically. The finances - representing the debt - should
have been invested in ways in which income could have
increased. For instance, export earnings and consequently
savings, should have increased as a result of the expansive
effect of external finances on investment. With the in-
creased export earnings and savings,the repayment of the
debts could have been made and the net outcome would be no
debts and new sources of export earnings and savings such
that imports and investments could be financed with domestic
resources. Even if the process could not be completed in
the time period under study, it could be expected that some
indication of an evolution towards that point would be
apparent. This has not been the case for Ghana. The
financing of the two gaps has not resulted in a sufficiently
expanded productive capacity.
If the expansion of productive output is to occur, it
is required that the effectiveness of each new investment
increase over time. If this occurs, it is easier for the
economy to repay the debts and avoid as great a need for
foreign supplementation of domestic resources.
Refer to Table 4. Using incremental output capital
ratio (IOCR) as a proxy for changes in productive capacity,
it is apparent that the capacity of the economy to produce
from capital employed declined throughout the 1960's and it
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wasn't until 1971 that the declining IOCR began to level
off. My hypothesis, then, is that the chronic need to
supplement domestic resources with foreign resources, i.e.
financing of the gaps, combined with the poor performance of
productive capacity are in large part responsible for the
escalation of external debt. Investments and the import
bill continued to grow each year primarily due to the
boosts provided by external finances expected to increase
productive capacity. When productive capacity, expected to
generate increases in savings from investments and export
earnings (foreign exchange) for the import bill and debt re-
payment, did not expand, the debts began to accumulate and
the economy became crippled, development efforts stifled.
I developed the following regression equation based
on the above hypothesis: D = a+b(T) + c(S) + d(IOCR)
where D = external public debt; T = trade gap, S =
savings gap; IOCR = incremental output capital ratio.
Both T and S represent the external borrowing that was
required to carry out import and investment plans. IOCR
represents the marginal changes in the productive output
of the economy. The significance of the equation is to
determine the nature of the relationship between the two
gaps, IOCR and external public debt.
The reason for the use of the trade and savings gaps
in this equation is that they roughly represent the amount
of foreign aid required and received by the economy to
finance investment plans and the import bill. It is
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expected that the financing of the gaps - a proxy for foreign
aid received - combined with the low productive capacity,
substantially encouraged the growth of debt. The results
of the regression are; D = 1053.359 + .638(T) - 1.112(S) -
881.289 (IOCR).
Together, the independent variables account for 90%
(.907) of the variance in debt and there are eight degrees
of freedom.
Results indicate that a single unit change in the
trade gap or a single unit increase in the gap can be
expected to result in a .64 unit increase in debt. The
T value is equal to 4.817 indicating a .005 level of
significance or 99% certainty that the relationship
between the trade gap and the debt is not insignificant.
Financing of the trade gap doesn't appear to have had a
very large impact on debt, though the impact indicated
does appear to be significant.
A single unit change or increase in the savings
gap can be expected to bring about a 1.11 unit change or
decrease in the external debt. This is a curious out-
come because the implications are that the larger the
savings gap becomes, the smaller will be public debt. I
expected a positive rather than negative relationship
between the savings gap and debt, and cannot explain this
outcome. I did regress other savings gap figures on
debt, however, and the sign was negative then, as well.
The T value is equal to .419, consequently the confidence
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attached to the above relationship (between the savings
gap and the debt) is very low. The impact of the financing
of the savings gap on debt is not significantly different
from zero.
IOCR appears to have the most significant impact on
public debt since a single unit change in IOCRcould
be expected to inversely impact debt substantially. The
T value is equal to 4.8 indicating a .005 level of signif-
icance or 99% confidence that the impact of IOCR on debt
is significantly different from zero. The seemingly
large impact of IOCR on debt is no doubt offset by the
typical size of annual changes in IOCR,generally between
.132 and .001 units. It takes a long time to bring
about a single unit change in IOCR, and consequently an .881
unit change in debt. Even over the period studied, IOCR
did not increase or decrease by a total unit (it actually
experienced a consistent decline of .681 or 68% of a
single unit).
In summary, it appears that the three variables are
key elements involved in the growth of debt and only
the trade gap and IOCR are significantly different from
zero. The strange behavior or impact of debt relative
to the savings gap is not significantly different from
zero.
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Part III
Issues
These are issues I consider to be important and
relevant to the causes behind the growth of debt. They
include: (1) credit financed development; (2) the optimal
type of development and industrialization as a strategy
for growth and development; (3) international specialization
and manipulation of the terms of trade; (4) external
orientation of the economy; and (5) the contribution made
by debt management policies.
Credit financed development
In its attempt to develop, Ghana was caught in a bind.
Acceptance of official aid on concessional terms would have
meant the acquiesence of development policy makers to the
requests of the providers of aid. Policy makers may have
been forced to give up projects they believed were important
to development progress for the sake of projects that were
of higher priority to the lenders. The alternative was
the acceptance of the supplier's and contractor's credits on
commercial terms, in order to finance development. When pay-
ments began to fall due, more often than not, the projects
had not yet generated the output and revenue needed to re-
pay, and consequently, debt accumulated. Because Ghana could
not, due to its political and economic orientations,
attract concessional long term aid, it had to resort to
acceptance of commercial short term aid to finance what
were considered to be high priority development projects,
33.
which tended to be characterized, for a variety of reasons,
by low levels of economic return.
"...nations have failed to develop not because
they had too little international money, but
because they had too much. All nations will
find that some imports are genuinely essential,
and many more are useful if properly utilized,
when they develop new industries and a new
productive capacity. But imports are somewhat
analogous to medicines administered to an ailing
body. The same medicine which, in small doses,
aids and stimulates the body's own powers of
recovery may, in massive amounts, enervate and
addict the patient beyond hope of recovery.
The analogy to an addictive drug can be carried
to some length. Just as a 'pusher' finds it
good business to provide free samples on which
potential users can get 'hooked', so the grant
aid of the 1950's served to make poor nations
dependent on Western brand names and accustomed
to the idea of development via imports, rather
than by their own efforts, thus paving the way
to the debt slavery of the 1960's and 1970's.
And, just as the absence of heroin means nothing
to the non-addict but is shattering for the addict,
so the nation which has once accepted the pusher's
wares will find the denial of aid much more
difficult and dangerous than the one which has
never succumbed to, or been offered the chance
of, temptation. The nation which is trying to
break out of the system is bound to suffer
withdrawal pains, the severity of which will be
proportional to the previous degree of aid
dependence."
This quote by Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap, illuminates
the problem associated with the use of commercial credit
to finance development. The credits received by Ghana
were all attached to the purchase of imports considered
to be required for development and growth. Between 1959
and 1965, Ghana received credits and contracts very easily
from creditors anxious to make sells. The flood of this
type of aid - commercial terms - into an economy in which
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the development emphasis was on infrastructure and other
social and public servi-ce provision - not direct investment
into ventures that would quickly aid :expansion of produc-
tive capacity - helped to create an unmanageable external
debt position. The problem was not that Ghana received
too little or too much aid, but that it received too little
of the appropriate type of aid - long term concessional aid -
in view of the priorities of its development portfolio.
Perhaps if Ghana had been able to attract concessional aid
as it began implementation of its development plans, the
debt problem may have been short circuited. Additionally,
had it not been thought that development required imported
inputs - intermediate goods, etc. - the debt problem may have
been short circuited.
Optimal typ of development and industrialization as a
strategy for growth and development.
Ghana's debt accumulated as it attempted to implement
its development plans. This calls to question the type of
development aimed for.
"One type (of development) is built on servicing
the needs of the rich countries, or more precisely,
of the corporations in the rich countries.
Development of this type will bring in the latest
technological gadgets, but only for the purposes
which suit the corporations, such as extracting
mineral ores. The other type of development starts
by ensuring that everybody has enough food to eat
and works up from there to provide more amenities
as it becomes possible to produce them. No very
high levels of technology are needed in the first
stages of this type of development."
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In its attempt to modernize the traditional sectors,
Ghana opted for the first type of development. Based
on the recommendations made by expatriate development
specialists, and accepted by Ghanian officials, the
premise of the plans for development included agricultural
and industrial development strategies which were highly
import oriented, and consequently, inappropriate to the
Ghanian context, as evidenced by their failure.
"The orthodox strategy for developing a country
calls for massive infusion, by purchase and
import from abroad, of industrial and agricultural
technologies and equipment, of processed and
semiprocessed materials for assembly; of plans,
planners, advisors, technicians and other experts.
Thus, practically everything said to be
required for development, it is recommended, must
be imported--formulas, nuts, bolts and brains.
All these must be bought on the international
market of the Western economic system. By the
rules of that market, however, they must be
paid for in foreign exchange, something which
most under-developed countries are short of.
Barter between countries is discouraged.
The payment rules of this international
market, this orthodox strategy of buying
development and carting it home, and the low
earnings of Third World commodities, relative
to the prices of what they must import, together
guarantee that any such country, should it embark
upon an infusionist development plan, shall spend
its way into a chronic foreign exchange crisis."*
Ghana's case exemplifies this analysis made by
Chinweizu. The growth strategy selected was based on
the use of inputs which could not be produced domestically
(hence their inappropriateness) and created a dependency
on imports - for the sake of development.
Chinweizu, "The Third World: Trap into Peonage"
Africa, No. 83, 7/78.
36.
International specialization and manipulation of the
terms of trade
The concept of international specialization is based
on the premise that an economy should mass produce those
products it can produce more cheaply than most other
economies (exports) and buy those products which it
cannot produce as cheaply (imports). The financial re-
sources used to pay for the imports (foreign exchange) are
to be generated by selling exports. That is, each
economy should exploit, for the benefit. of the world,
its comparative advantage.
Since all products are theoretically sold at their
production costs, with some margin for profit, the
exchanges should be fair and equal. Samir Amin in Unequal
Development makes some interesting observations regarding
the system of international exchange and trade terms. He
states that the theoretical logistics of the system breaks
down when a group of sellers of the same or similar product
creates monopolies, and are able to hike the price of
their goods , substantially above production costs relative
to the prices of goods that they themselves must import.
he also makes reference to the fact that despite the fast
and constantly growing levels of efficiency, and the con-
sequent decline in production costs, it should be expected
that the prices of the exports specifically from the West
would have declined between the 1940's to 1970's. However,
the prices of these low cost exports from the West charged
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to the developing world did not experience a reduction
primarily because of the existence of monopolies.
In the 1960's, the declining trade terms of Ghana's
exports did adversely influence its ability to repay the
credits and loans received. Combined with the trade and
savings gaps and regressed on debt, the terms of trade
does appear to have had a non zero impact on debt. The
result of the regression is:
D = 41.475 + 14.542 (T) - 13.606 (S) - 1.875 (TT) where
TT is equal to the terms of trade; the r is .750. There
were nine degrees of freedom. The results indicate that
there was indeed an inverse relationship between the
trade terms and debt. A single unit increase in
could be expected to result in a -1.876 unit decrease in
debt - a substantial contribution. The T value is equal
to 2 a rendering the significance level .05 and 95%
confidence that the impact of the trade terms on debts
was, in fact negative and not insignificant.
Within the framework of international specialization
the developing economies have concentrated most of their
productive efforts in raw materials and foodstuffs for
export while the more developed economies have concentrat-
ed their efforts on development of capital and technology
for export. The producers of capital and other technology
have been more successful in developing sellers' monopolies,
thus increasing the relative price of the goods.so
heavily depended on in most developing economies. The
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relatively low earnings of their (LDC) export sector
are not able to cover the costs of the required imports.
Barring the oil-producing countries, the producers of
food-stuffs and raw materials have been unable to create
monopolies and cartels in order to command higher prices.
Certainly, the resource-rich African nations have the
resource potential to create sellers monopolies, but the
strong political and cultural subdivisions render that
possibility highly unlikely in the near future. Excessive
external debt has largely accumulated due to the relatively
unequal international system of exchange which is based
on the concept of international specialization of a
structural arrangement "...which prevents proper domestic
investment of surplus, and instead promotes its flight
(1)
abroad." The relative unprofitability of the export
sector coupled with the dependence on imports magnified
and complicated the debt problem.
External orientation of the economy
Acceptance of the concept of international special-
ization required that a vast amount of resources be
channelled to that sector of the economy which was con-
sidered to be most promising in its ability to attract
(1) Amin, Samir, Unequal Development, Monthly Review Press,
1975.
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outside buyers. In that way, the economy hoped to
generate the foreign exchange needed to buy imports for
development and other purposes. A result of this kind
of concentration was the neglect of other sectors of the
economy and society.
Since foreign aid is used largely to finance develop-
ment plans and their imported inputs, it seems logical
to expect that the outcome of any negotiations around
the provision of aid will tend to result in the investment
of aid to those sectors deemed most important or profitable
from the point of view of the lender, at the expense of
other sectors, more important to the needs of the internal
market. This explains why, in the first two development
decades, so much foreign aid was channelled to import
oriented sectors and export sectors that provided inputs
for capital production abroad, i.e., light industry, and
mineral extraction and food production. Ghana formerly
placed a significant amount of its resources into modern-
izing or industrializing the cocoa and timber sectors
and presently is channelling a significant amount of its
resources toward the extraction of gold and other minerals
for export to the developed world. At the same time,
many of the basic needs of the bulk of the population
have not been met. Because development was so highly
dependent on imports and could only be purchased with
foreign exchange, the export sector received most of the
attention and resources needed for development at the
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expense and neglect of others.
Economic and debt management policies
Once developing economies have accepted foreign aid
and incurred debt, how are they kept in the indebted
position? Chinweizu answers this way:
"By the normal workings of Western management
of their economies, a management imposed on
acquiescent countries by IMF prescriptions and
supervision backed by threats of sundry economic
punishments if IMF's 'recommendations' are dis-
regarded. A management imposed on rebellious
countries by the threat of political destabiliz-
ation, and, if necessary, by actual coups of in-
vasions to unseat chronically 'refractory' regimes
and replace them with others which will comply
with IMF dictation."*
Despite popular disapproval, the IMF played a
significant role in the attempts to develop and implement
policies to alleviate the debt problem.
Conversations with Ghanians indicate that Nkrumah
had an unwritten policy which indicated no intention of
repaying the debts, and upon realization of this, certain
entities of the West helped to oust him by supporting
his opposition. He was replaced by a military administr-
ation which openly accepted the debt obligations and
against popular opinion called the IMF to Ghana to
help stabilize the economy. Through a comprehensive
economic management program, it is not clear that the
* Chinweizu, "The Third World's Trap into Peonage",
Africa, No. 83 7/78
policies implemented actually aided the problem.
The "stabilization program", which included policies
for debt management, was implemented. The program
included: (1) a squeeze on public spending; (2) a
'shake-out' of labor from the public sector: (3) tariff,
duty and import license changes and (4) devaluation. The
stabilization period was followed by reschedulings in
1966, 1968 and 1974.
The squeeze on public spending and the labor 'shake-
out' were very unpopular elements. They resulted in
less (already short) public utilities and service and
social services such as education and welfare. The
tariff duty and import license changes were made in an
effort to liberalize imports, a curious policy for an
economy chronically short on foreign exchange. Probably
the most devastating effect of the stabilization program
with regard to the debt was the devaluation which
resulted in a 31% increase in the nominal external debt
obligations, thus adding insult to injury. The combin-
ation of the liberalized imports and devaluations does
not appear to have had a significantly positive effect
on the external position. Theoretically, the combined
effect of a liberal import scheme and a currency
devaluation should be offsetting. However, (refer to
Table 3 ) if the devaluation results in an increase in
debt and weaker purchasing power of the cedi relative
to the foreign exchange that must be purchased to repay
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the debts, then it is fair to guess that the external
situation would deteriorate rather than improve.
In 1974, the debt continued to grow. In fact, over
the 9 year time span - within the period under study -
during which the IMF influenced internal economic
policies, the debt problem did not improve.
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Conclusion
The purpose of my thesis was to determine some of
the major causes of excessive debt growth in Ghana. My
original hypothesis was based on the assumption that
international agencies and governments lending resources
created the circumstances and mechanisms,which I'd hoped
to discover, that were responsible for the accumulation;
and that recipient governments were largely inactive and
innocent victims of circumstances beyond their control.
However, I have come to learn that the accumulation
of debt was due to circumstances and mechanisms created
not only by the lenders, but by the borrower as well. On
the creditor side, corruption and dishonesty, manifest
through overcharging, supplying obsolete and defective
equipment, reneging on work agreed upon in the contract
and paid for, etc. all helped to decrease the likelihood
of repayment by sabotaging productivity. On the recipient
side, the internal strucure of the country suffered from
administrative and planning incompetence, and a general
lack of prudency around the structuring of meaningful
and viable economic development policies. The most
blatant example of this was the massive use of medium
term supplier's credits to finance infrastructure projects
and "turn key" projects which had questionable economic
returns.
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In the final analysis, both the donors and the
recipients appear to have been responsible for the
growth of debt. I do, however, still have an intuitive
feeling that indicates that further research would show
that the actions of the donors were devious and subtle
with the result that their contributions to the debt
problem were much more damaging than those of the
borrower. These feelings are based on the evidence that
showed that creditors tended to be involved in the develop-
ment process more for the sake of self interest than for
the sake of development, resulting in an implicit policy
of lending to finance one's own exports rather than to
promote growth and development.
The policy options available to Nkrumah when he
negotiated the receipt of the credits ranged, in theory,
from total rejection of all credit on terms provided, to
total acceptance, the tendency being toward the latter.
Had I, given the advantage of hindsight, the opportunity
to advise Nkrumah, I would have suggested that whatever
option selected, it should be clear that the credit
terms be appropriate given the nature of the projects
they were to finance. More explicitly, the projects
must be expected to generate the amount needed for
repayment by the time repayment is due.
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The major cause of Ghana's debt problem was that
the credit repayment terms were not appropriate given
the economic returns of the credit financed projects.
The responsibility to insure this match lies with both
the donor and recipient, requiring a better balance of
power in the negotiation process. A better power balance
would be helpful in insuring not only a realistic relation-
ship between credit terms and project return, but that
the projects implemented are truly meaningful to the
development of the recipient, and not just a means of
expanding the export market of the donor.
My further research will include a broader study
of the causes of excessive debt accumulation in order
to determine how generalizable the conclusions reached
in this case study are and to determine other causes
of accumulation. Logically, when a significant portion
of one's funds are tied to payments to the outside world,
limitations are placed on the ability to develop intern-
ally. Additional research will include the effects
excessive debt has on the potential and actual develop-
ment of the debtor economy. Eventually, I hope to
develop some strong policy conclusions related to the
alleviation of current levels of debt, and the avoidance
of future additions to the excessive accumulations.
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APPENDIX
End of Year Grand Total
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
82.2
124.5
197.3
313.3
670.7
785.5
860.1
994.7
1,055.5
1,110.5
1,192.6
1,259.2
1,429.8
1,507.3
1,828.5
External
Total
12.7
16.4
25.5
38.3
346.8
373.4
395.3
480.7
491.9
506.4
543.6
556.2
663.5
675.8
652.5
Central Government
( m)
Long term
6.4
6.4
16.8
28.7
335.6
366.8
383.2
421.0
409.0
432.8
479.2
509.4
624.7
648.0
640.9
Short term
6.3
10.0
8.7
9.6
11.0
11.6
12.1
59.7
82.9
73.6
64.4
46.8
38.8
27.8
11.6
Debt
Internal
Total Long term
75.5
108,2
171.8
275.0
323.9
407.1
464.7
514.0
563.6
604.1
649.0
703.0
766.3
831.5
1,176.0
64.5
74.2
93.4
190.4
180.9
207.4
289.5
362.0
392.7
410.2
455.0
504.0
545.5
610.7
961.3
Short term
12.0
34.0
78.4
84.5
143.3
199.7
175.2
152.0
170.9
193.9
194.0
199.0
220.8
220.8
214.7
Source: Economic Survey of Ghana, for years given. Supplier's credit is considered
medium term and is classified, in this listing, as long term debt.
Table 1
Table 2
Central Government Debt
(percentages)
End of
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Year Grand Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
External
Total
14.2
13.1
12.9
12.3
51.7
48.2
46.0
48.3
46.6
45.6
45.6
44.2
46.4
44.8
35.7
Long term
7.2
5.1
8.5
9.2
50.1
46.7
44.6
42.3
38.7
39.0
40.2
40.5
43.7
43.0
35.1
Source: Economic Survey of Ghana,
Short term
7.1
8.0
4.4
3.1
1.6
1.5
1.4
6.0
7.9
6.6
5.4
3.7
2.7
1.8
0.6
for years given.
Total
85.8
86.9
87.1
87.8
48.3
51.8
54.0
51.7
53.4
54.4
54.4
55.8
53.6
55.2
64.3
Internal
Long term
72.3
59.6
47.3
60.8
26.9
26.4
33.7
36.4
37.2
36.9
38.1
40.0
38.2
40.5
52.6
Short term
13.5
27.3
39.7
27.0
21.4
25.4
20.4
15.3
16.2
17.5
16.3
15.8
15.4
14.7
11.7
Table 3
KNOWN GOVERNMENT FOREIGN LIABILITIFS AS AT THE END OF YEAR
N5Z'000
(') (1)1960 1%1 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1967
Joint Consolidated Fund .. 6,280 9,966 8,656 9,646 10,994 11,588 12,116 10,086 15,136
Government Stocks.. .. .. . 6,360 6,360 6,360 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340 1,910 2,867
I.M.F. Drawings . . .. - - 10,178 10,178 10,178 10,178 33,912 29,724 44,604
Volta River Project loans .. .. .. - - 260 16,208 32,042 46,345 55,266 46,342 69,543
Suppliers' Credit (*), (t) .. -- 
- - - 286,276 301,010 283,583 273,460 341,173
Counterpart Funds .. .. .. .. .. 
- - 4,956 6,902 8,120 7,106 10,662
Total . .. .. 12,640 16,326 25,454 38,372 346,786 378,363 395,337 368,628 483,985
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Joint Consolidated Fund .. 15,136 15,746 6,517 - 5 7 7 7
Government Stocks .. 2,867 2,867 2,867 - - - - -
LM.F. Drawings .. .. 44,604 67,109 67,095 64,395 46,818 38,746 27,746 11,465
Volta River Project Loans .. 69,543 78,797 75,962 74,155 75,265 99,051 88,745 85,364
-Suppliers' Credit(2) .. 333,913 311,548 302,195 293,287 283,442 297,241 295,753 291,984
Counterpart Funds .. .. 10,662 15,809 51,759 106,545 133,936 201,396 236,917 236,721
K.F.W. West German Loan .. - - 5,253 9,517 12,975 12,351 12,595
International Development Association - - - 10,169 14,075 14,264 14,332
Total .. 480,725 491,876 506,395 543,635 556,152 663,491 675,783 652,559
Source: Economic Survey of Ghana
Table 4
National Savings Relative to National Income
A NS/NI /NS/NI
-.05 (1960-1961)
.44
-. 07
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
-. 5
.18
.09
.13
.12
.16
.08
.07
.06
.09
.11
.301
IOCR
1.31
1.267
1.135
1.01
.951
.873
.804
.740
.689
.684
.683
.685
.44
0
.44
Derived from figures published in the following:
Source: World Tables, 1976 and 1980; Clark Leith, Foreign
Trade Regimes and Economic Development in Ghana,
Columbia University Press, 1974.
N-S/NI
-. 125
-. 14
.33
.13
.09
.13
.13
.09
Table 5
Annual Changes in Imports and Exports
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Annual average
growth rate
A Exports/Exports A Imports/Imports
.02
-. 01
-. 02
-.17
.07
.05
.02
-.11
.18
.31
.14
.22
-. 18
.49
.28
.13
10%
-. 02
.32
-. 24
.006
.18
.15
.26
-. 01
-. 15
.40
.75
12%
Derived from
Source: World Tables,
figures published in the
1976 and 1980.
Table 6
Resource Gaps *
(C m)
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Trade Gap
-63
-97
-42
-69
-49
-141
-76
-38
-8
-13
-31
-112
155
151
-199
* Current prices.
Source: Economic Survey of Ghana, for years shown.
Savings Gap
-73
-110
-52
-87
-61
-160
-90
-70
-60
-61
-76
-158
117
125
-230
Table 7
Regression Results
coef stand err
constant -7.980
0.117
0.886
27.937
0.013
0.693
dsfd
12.000
F ratio sis
0.082 0.780
12.000 86.710 0.000
12.000 1.632 0.226
r2 = 0.891
constant
TT
-28.727
0.579
20.841
0.347
11.000
11.000
1.900 0.195
2.783 0.123
r2 = 0.202
constant
IOCR
TT
-37.049
-14.581
0.409
29.500
33.042
0.188
9.000
9.000
9.000
1.577 0.241
0.195 0.669
4.753 0.057
r2 = 0.359
constant 1053.359 237.588 8.000 19.656 0.002
0.064 0.806
0.176 0.686
-881.289 182.704 8.000 23.267 0.001
r2 = 0.907
0.638
-1.112
IOCR
2.515
2.651
8.000
8.000
Table 7 con't.
constant
T
S
coef
-101.149
11.416
-10.944
stand err
111.239
3.283
3.360
r2 = 0.525
constant
T
S
TT
r2 =0.750
ds fd
12.-000
12.000
12.000
F ratio
0.827
12.090
10.607
sis
0.381
0.005
0.007
-41.475
14.543
-13.606
-1.876
111.537
3.019
3.046
0.938
9.000
9.000
9.000
9.000
0.138
23.206
19.952
3.999
0.719
0.001
0.002
0.077
